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Article 6

Death of a 78- Year Old Woman
(Editor's note: This official opinion of the District Attorney of
Milwaukee County, E. Michael McCann , represents a synthesis of sound
jurisprudence and sound medical-ethical reasoning in a difficult medical
situation.)

In the early morning hours of Oct. 7, 1986, a 78-year old woman patient
was admitted to Victory Memorial Hospital in Waukegan, Illinois. At the
hospital, she was cared for by Dr. G. A. Price.
Dr. Price stated that the patient experienced a major heart attack,
causing a large area of heart muscle damage. He further stated that three
additional factors appeared which contributed to a poor prognosis for the
patient: (I) changes in her heart rhythm; (2) fairly severe congestive heart
failure, and (3) shock. The doctor further noted that the patient's age and
previous heart muscle damage detracted from her prognosis. Dr. Price
informed the patient's physician-son of this poor prognosis within the first
48 hours of her hospitalization.
As care continued, Dr. Price concluded that the patient's heart muscle
was very weak and that, as her normal heart rhythm alternated into more
rapid beating, it limited the efficiency of her heart. While the patient was
still in the hospital, on Oct. 26, 1986, the heart rhythm problem became
acutely serious and the patient had to be cardio-shocked back into a less
lethal rhythm.
Thereafter, doctors at Victory Memorial Hospital determined that it was
advisable to transfer the patient to the cardiology service at St. Luke's
Hospital, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, in the belief that if the patient's
condition so warranted, invasive diagnostic procedures could be instituted
and appropriate invasive management could be undertaken at that
hospital. No such "invasive treatment" is conducted at Victory Hospital.
Dr. Price indicated that the patient may not have been eager to go to St.
Luke's, but that the need to address the life-threatening heart rhythm
problem apparently quieted her reservations and that she actively
participated in the decision to transfer to St. Luke's.
Her physician-son resided in Milwaukee. It was determined that Dr. 1. F.
King would care for her at St. Luke's.
On Oct. 29, 1986, the patient was transferred to St. Luke's Hospital.
Her condition appeared to improve from Oct. 29 to Nov. 4, 1986. On
16

Linacre Quarterly

that date , the patient had a stress test which apparently left her extremely
exhausted. She experienced a difficult night on Nov. 4, had trouble
breathing, experienced chest pain, and required oxygen.
On Nov. 5, 1986, the breathing difficulty and chest pain continued . A
lung scan was ordered because of the breathing problem. The patient's
condition improved later in the day.
In the morning of Nov. 6, 1986, the patient felt tired and nauseated and
experienced chest pain.
On Nov. 7, another severe heart rhythm acceleration (supra-ventricular
tachycardia) occurred again, necessitating the use of cardio-shock.
Sedation was utilized . The patient was intubated with an endotracheal
tube (inserted through the mouth and down the windpipe) and placed on a
respirator. The drug dopamine was used to address a low blood pressure
problem . Dr. King requested Dr. Stuart Levy to examine the patient on a
consult and Dr. Levy's report is attached. Another lung scan reflected
findings "compatible with worsening congestive failure."
Visit from Nephew

Later on Nov. 7, the patient's 36-year old nephew visited her. The
endotracheal tube effectively precluded speech. In commuicating with her
nephew, the patient made gestures with her left hand to the room and the
intensive care equipment and indicated, through pantomime, that the
effort was unwise. The nephew observed that the endotracheal tube
seemed to cause the patient discomfort.
On Nov. 8, attempts were made to gradually wean the patient from the
dopamine and the endotracheal tube linked to the respirator. The patient
appeared to be alert and cooperating with her care. By evening, the
dopamine was withdrawn.
During the weekend of Nov. 8 and 9, 1986, Dr. G. Dorros , as a
substitute for Dr. King, was in charge of the care of the patient. He visited
her on Saturday morning and returned again on Sunday morning, Nov. 9.
At that time, Dr. Dorros examined a nuclear medicine report of a Gated
Heart Study which had been conducted on the patient. The study cited
serious difficulties in the patient's heart.
After examining this report, Dr. Dorros discussed its contents with Dr.
King and together the physicians determined that the patient should
receive a heart catheterization on Monday, Nov. 10. Dorros believed that
the catheterization would provide added information assisting Dr. King to
determine which of the following options should be pursued in treatment
of the patient: (I) heart surgery; (2) angioplasty (insertion of a device into
the clogged artery to open it); (3) medication regimen, or (4) do nothing
because the patient's problems would not be susceptible to treatment other
than basic ca re.
With Dr. King's consent, Dr. Dorros, sometime between 8 a.m. and 9:30
a.m. on Nov. 9, contacted the patient's physician-son by phone at his home.
Ma y, 1988

17

Dr. Dorros advised that in his communication to the patient's son, he
reported the results ofthe Gated Heart Study, being careful to note that the
aneurism or possible pseudo-aneurism had not been confirmed and that
relying on the scan alone results in a high false positive rate. Dorros further
stated that he reported the recommendations for cardiac catheterization and
what options might be suggested thereafter. Dorros described the general
tone of the conversation as neutral, with Dorros doing most of the talking
and responding to questions by the patient's son. Dorros states that there
was no talk of the patient as being a dying person and that he offered
encouraging words and described the patient as "potentially recoverable".
Dorros said the son indicated his approval for the heart catheterization.
It is rather clear that the patient's son understood and interpreted this
communication from Dr. Dorros as being the opposite of encouraging.
The patient's son stated he concluded from the call that the prognosis was
quite poor, that the heart was in a disastrous condition and that the only
hope would be heart surgery. The son believed his mother would never
authorize cardiac catheterization or heart surgery.
There was no question that the woman's condition was serious. Dorros
recognized the gravity of her condition, but believed that the cardiac
catheterization might well show her able to recover in substantial measure.
The physician-son took a much more pessimistic view of her prospects.
The son stated that on Sunday morning, he also learned that his mother
had experienced severe blood pressure problems Saturday evening and
that it had been necessary to place her back on dopamine. The son
perceived the use of dopamine as appropriate for those cases involving
serious blood pressure problems. The son states that he arrived at the
hospital at about 10:30 a.m. on Nov. 9, and at such time his mother looked
gray, her hands were cold, her pulse was very high, her blood pressure was
low, she was again on dopamine, and she was getting maximum support
from a respirator through the endotracheal tube inserted into her mouth
and down her windpipe.
It is clear from the reports of all who observed the patient that day that
she was conscious, alert, and competent from the time that Dr. Dorros saw
her early on Sunday morning until the time she expired after the removal
of the endotracheal tube at or about 12:42 p.m. A substantial number of
persons saw her on Nov. 9 and not one believed her to be in other than
competent condition.
The patient's son stated that shortly after he arrived at the hospital, his
mother gestured to him that she wished the endotracheal tube taken out
and the respirator turned off. Further, she indicated that the intensive care
effort being made was unwise and tried to take the IV out of her right arm ,
He believed she was dying. The son stated that a nurse was present at the
time and that he informed his mother as to what the results would be if the
endotracheal tube was removed . Nurse Heyse was the nurse present in the
room and his report of the communication between the mother and son at
that time is as follows:
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The son asked, "Do you want that tube taken out?" She nodded yes. " Do you
know you need that to breathe?" She nodded yes . "And you know that if that tube
is taken out, you won't be able to breathe and you' ll die?," he said. She nodded
yes . "But you still want the tube taken out and nothing else done?," he said . She
nodded yes.

The son then requested the nurse to contact Dr. Dorros to secure removal
of the tube.
The patient's nephew arrived in the mother's hospital room after her
son. The son advised the nephew that he, the son, had been informed that
the study showed the heart to be in a disastrous condition with many
defects and that the patient was dying.
The nephew stated that when persons would come into the room, the
patient would indicate with gestures that she wanted the endotracheal tu be
and IV tubes removed . At one point, the nephew saw the patient pull the
respirator tube connection loose and a nurse appeared immediately and
reconnected it. The reconnection is confirmed by a nurse. The nephew
stated that this happened a second time and he himself reconnected the
tube. In response to the nephew's question, the patient indicated she
wanted the tube out of her throat and the IV disconnected .

Patient Tried to Remove Tube
One nurse stated that several times the patient attempted to remove the
tube but her son told her not to. A second nurse, Mr. Heyse, stated that on
one occasion the patient had put her hand to the tube and the son pulled
the hand down, telling her the tube would have to be put back in because of
hospital policy. Heyse reported a second exchange between the son and
mother about removal of the tube and what the effect would be, with the
same questions and answers as are within the above quote marks .
After the first communication between mother and son, which was
witnessed by Nurse Heyse as reported above, the son initially requested
and then became adamant that the endotracheal tube should be removed.
When the nurses resisted, he demanded that superiors be contacted . Upper
level personnel became involved but relayed back to the patient's son that
the final decision would be the treating doctor's decision, pursuant to
hospital policy guidelines.
During the later morning hours of Sunday, Nov. 9, 1986, Dr. Dorros
had become aware of the patient's son's intent to implement his mother's
desire to be removed from the respirator. Dorros arrived at the hospital
room while the patient's son was absent. Dorros entered the room and
discussed the patient's condition with the patient and her nephew, advising
both that she was "salvageable" and not a terminal case, that she would
have the cardiac catheterization on Monday, Nov. 10, and that he would
not order the endotracheal tube removed. As Dr. Dorros was completing
this discussion, the patient's son re-entered the room . Dr. Dorros stated
that in the presence of the nephew , the patient, the patient's son and other
hospital personnel he repeated the same information and refused to
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remove the endotracheal tube. Dr. Dorros states that the patient was alert
and responsive and believes she understood when he informed her of this.
The son asked Dorros to step outside in the corridor so they could
converse further. Dorros stated he told the son he would not pull the tube.
The son told Dorros he understood Dorros's position and agreed with
him. The son said that if it was his patient, he wouldn't pull the tube . The
son explained that he and his mother didn't want any heroic measures
taken to save her life. The son asked that she be a "No code" patient. The
son went on to ask what would happen if the endotracheal tube came out
- would it be reinserted? Dorros replied that it would not be reinserted if
the patient was a "No code". Dorros characterized the family's feelings
about the endotracheal tube as saying it was "cruel and unusual
punishment". Dr. Dorros determined to enter a "No code 4" order; that is,
under hospital guidelines, to "suspend the otherwise automatic initiation
of cardiopulmonary resuscitation. " Dr. Dorros then went to the nurse's
station to enter the physician's order for "No code 4".
St. Luke's Hospital guidelines for "Do Not Resuscitate Orders" provide
that "A mentally competent adult has the legal right to accept or refuse any
form of treatment and his / her wishes must be recognized and honored by
the physician ." The guidelines further provide that "When the patient is
competent, do not resuscitate (DNR) decisions will be reached
consensually by the physician and the patient." Under the guideline, Dr.
Dorros should have discussed this DNR order with the patient. However,
the clear communications between the son and mother as witnessed and
quoted by Nurse Heyse above, leave little doubt that the mother was
supportive of the DNR order. Failure by Dr. Dorros to strictly abide by
the guidelines, under these circumstances, constitutes no wrongdoing.
View from Nurses' Station

One of the nurses who had been present and had heard Dr. Dorros's
discussion with the patient's son in the hospital room, went to the nurse's
station to make appropriate notes. At the nurse's station, there is a
television monitor covering the inside of the room in which the patient was
being treated. Moments later, this nurse, upon looking up to the television
monitor, states that he saw the son grab the hand of his mother, bring it to
the endotracheal tube, wrap her fingers around the endotracheal tube, and
motion to the mother to pull the tube out. Thereafter, the nurse observed
the mother deliberately pull out the endotracheal tube. Immediately
thereafter, the son started to hug his mother and began to stroke her hair.
A nurse re-entered the room and asked if any help was needed and was
advised in the negative. Later, a nurse would be advised by the patient's
son that the endotracheal tube came out inadvertently. Under the "No code
4" order, nothing was done and the patient died within a few minutes.
Dr. Dorros was at the nurses' station writing the "No code" order when
someone called his attention to the room monitor for the patient's room.
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Dorros stated that he observed that the endotracheal tube was already out.
Dorros said he was angry and frustrated and drove from the hospital to his
home in Fox Point. He received a phone call from a nurse shortly
thereafter and was told that the patient had died.
The patient's nephew reconstructed the events somewhat differently. He
stated that after the patient's son returned from his discussion with Dr.
Dorros in the hallway, the patient's son untied his mother's hand. The
nephew states that the mother then brought her hand up to her face , with
the son's hand on hers . The nephew states that the patient felt along her
cheek and then the son let go of her hand. Thereafter, according to the
nephew , the patient grasped the endotracheal tube and pulled it out. The
nephew said that the son hugged and kissed his mother, that she gasped for
breath , and a minute or two later became unconscious . The nephew states
that at no time did the patient indicate she wanted the tube reinserted.
The son stated his mother was very rational , very adamant, and
repetitive in expressing her desire to have the tube removed . In the face of
this , he stated he agreed with her and pressed the nurses and supervisors to
accomplish this. Delay ensued and he was distressed and angered by it.
After the passage of a period of time , he left his mother's hospital room to
make a phone call to his wife . When he returned, Dr. Dorros was there.
The son stated that he heard only the tail end of Dr. Dorros's conversation
with the nephew and that Dr. Dorros did not go over the same explanation
for the son. The son stated that he and Dorros went out into the hallway.
The son told Dorros that if he was in Dorros's shoes , he would not order
the tube taken out. The son further indicated that he did not think that
Dorros should be put in that position. The son stated he did ask Dorros if
Dorros would reinsert the tube if it came out. Dorros said that he would
not reinsert the tube. The son stated that immediately after this
conversation in the hall, he, the son, went back to his mother's room and
told her, "If you want the tube out, you'll have to take it out yourself." The
son stated that without any hesitation , his mother grabbed the tube and
pulled it out. The son stated he could not be sure whether he was or was not
holding his mother's hand , but he is absolutely sure he did not touch the
tube nor pull it out nor gesture for her to pull it out. The son stated he felt
that his mother was a very devout Catholic and did not intend to take her
own life by removing the tube, but merely wanted to end the extraordinary
life support measures on which she was depending and that he felt sure she
knew she was dying. The son indicated that he had never discussed the
prospect of heart surgery with his mother and that he believed , given her
condition on Sunday morning, that the mother was dying and that her
condition was terminal. When asked in the investigation whether or not a
physician should remove the tube, or whether he , the son, should remove
the tube , the son replied definitely not. He indicated that if the mother
could do it herself, then so be it.
The investigation revealed no ill will between the son and his mother and
discovered no evidence of malice on the part of the son. He appears
May, 1988

21

to have loved his mother.
The above does not set forth all that transpired or all that was reported
in the investigation. Some additional facts relevant to the legal questions
are included below.
Legal Comment
The son, under any given version of the facts , could be convicted of
assisting a suicide in violation of Wisconsin Statute 940. 12 only if the
mother's death was a suicide. For a number of reasons set forth below, her
death was not a suicide within the meaning of the law.
Wisconsin statutory law does not affirmatively define suicide. The
Wisconsin Supreme Court has defined suicide, however, in Bisenius v.
Karns. 42 Wis 2d 42( 1968) at 52 as "the voluntary and intentional taking of
one's life by a sane person." Generally, the person committing suicide
undertakes a self-destructive act of shooting, stabbing, or hanging oneself
or injecting or ingesting a poisonous drug with the intent to kill oneself.
In the instant case, no such self-destructive act was involved. At the
heart of the matter, instead, is the patient's decision to refuse to continue
the respirator treatment , a refusal she had a right under law to make. Such
refusal followed by death does not constitute suicide.
It is fundamentalla w that when treating a competent, conscious ad ult , a
physician must secure consent of the patient before intruding upon the
body in any fashion. The doctor who fails to secure such consent may be
found liable in civil law for damages and may be charged under criminal
law with battery. In SchloendorJJc. Society oj New York Hospital, 211
N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914), a case often cited for this principle , the
court stated, "Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a
right to determine what shall be done with his body; and a surgeon who
performs an operation without his patient's consent commits an assault for
which he is liable in damages." In Matter oj Erickson v. Dilgard, 44 Misc.
2d, 252, N. Y .S. 2d 705 (Supreme Court 1962), the competent adult patient ,
while authorizing a needed operation, refused to authorize a blood
transfusion and the hospital superintendent claimed that this would
constitute suicide. The court rejected that argument concluding that "it is
the individual who is the subject of a medical decision who has the final say
and that this must necessarily be so in a system of government which gives
the greatest possible protection to the individual in the furtherance of his
own desires." Similarly, in recent years, in most reported cases , courts have
refused to order blood transfusions for competent adult Jehovah
Witnesses who decline to accept such transfusions on religious grounds.
An exception to this rule is found in Application oj President and
Directors oj Georgetown College Inc., 331 F 2d 1000 (D .C. Cir. 1964),
where the court ordered a blood transfusion over a young sick mother's
objection in order to protect her life , holding that the state had a
compelling interest in limiting the potential that her minor children would
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become public charges. In Guardianship of Gertrude Raasch. Milwaukee
County Court Case Number 455-996 (1972), the court refused to order a
competent 77-year old woman to undergo surgery although the petitioning
hospital administrator alleged that she would die within several days
without it. St. Luke's Hospital's "Guidelines for the Removal of Patients
from Ventilators" recognize this rule providing that "competent adult
patients have the right to make the decision regarding their level of care
regardless of the severity of their illness." Further, the hospital's guidelines
for "Do Not Resuscitate Orders" provide that a "mentally competent adult
has the legal right to accept or refuse any form of treatment and his / her
wishes must be recognized and honored by the physician."
Professor Robert Byrn, in an article often cited in cases on this issue
entitled "Compulsory Life Saving Treatment for the Competent Adult, 44
Fordham L. Rev. I" (1975) stated:
(A) competent adult is free to reject lifesaving medical treatment unless some
other compelling state interest overbalances his claim of right. It is as much an
error to distort this freedom to include a right to commit suicide, as it is to
condemn its exercise as an attempt at suicide. Rejection of lifesaving therapy and
attempted suicide are. and should be. as different in la was the proverbial apples
and oranges.

This competent, conscious, and informed 78-year old patient had a right to
reject the endotracheal tube and this did not constitute suicide.
Element of Suicide is Desire
Further, an element of suicide is the desire to kill oneself. The facts in
this case do not reflect a desire on the part of this patient to die. Persons
who knew her said she travelled widely, was basically happy, and loved
life. She did not seek, invite , or wish for the heart damage which was the
efficient cause of her death. She did lawfully desire to end the respirator
treatment. Persons who knew her well, including a priest who had known
the family for many years, are in agreement in interpreting her attitude in
this matter as founded in acceptance of Divine Providence and basically
being:
I can 't and don't have to tolerate the tube in my condition. God's will be done . If I
can live without the respirator. fine; but if not , then it is time for my eternal
reward.

These words , used by those who knew her , find a resonant ring in the case
of Satz v. Perlmutter 362 so. 2d 160, 162-163 (Fla. App. 1978). There the
court stated:
As to suicide. the facts here unarguably reveal that Mr. Perlmutter would die, but
for the respirator. The disconnecting of it, far from causing his unnatural death
by means of a 'death prod ucing agent' in fact will merely result in his death , if at
all, from natural causes ... The testimony of Mr. Perlmutter ... is that he really
wants to live, but do so , God and Mother Nature willing, under his own power.
This basic wish to live, plus the fact that he did not self-induce his horrible
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affliction, precludes his further refusa l of treatment being classed as attempted
suicide.

Those who knew the 78-year old patient relate that she was a devout
Catholic, a regular churchgoer who would abhor committing an act of
suicide. In this regard , it should be noted that ethicists and moralists in
classic terms have indicated that a person need not undergo extraordinary
treatment to preserve his or her life. Whether treatment is ordinary or
extraordinary is determined not from the perspective of the hospital where
sophisticated and onerous invasive procedures are performed on a routine
basis, but rather from the perspective of the patient. Was it extraordinary
from the perspective of this 78-year old heart-damaged patient , who had
been cardio-shocked several times in the recent past, to require her to
continue to suffer the endotracheal tube and the respirator? To submit to
cardiac catheterization? To heart surgery? As she was a Catholic and
probably somewhat familiar with church teaching on that issue, it is worth
noting that the "Declaration on Euthanasia" approved by Pope John
Paul II (1980) states:
It is also permissible to make do with the normal means that medicine can offer.
Therefore one cannot impose on anyone the obligations to have recourse to a
technique which is already in use but which carries a risk or is burdensome. Such
a refusal is not the equivalent of suicide; on the contrary, it should be considered
as an acceptance of the human condition, or a wish to avoid the application of a
medical procedure disproportionate to the results that can be expected , or a
desire not to impose excessive expense on the family or the community.

At law, the death of this patient was not a suicide. Accordingly,
whatever the son did , or did not do , such conduct could not constitute the
crime of assisting in a suicide.
Influence on Decision
Our decision in this case is influenced by the fact that these events
occurred in a hospital and that all disinterested persons corroborated the
statement that the patient was conscious, competent and informed and
wanted the endotracheal tube removed.
Further, we note that as the patient was conscious , competent and
informed , we are not dealing with "substituted judgment" such as is the
situation with a minor or a person in a comatose or vegetative condition.
Different considerations playa role in such cases. In addition, as the
endotracheal tube and respirator are clearly medical treatments, we are
not confronted with such questions as may be raised by hydration and
nutrition.
A physician or hospital personnel, in dealing with a competent,
conscious adult patient , need not abide by every directive the patient has a
right to give. If a patient opts to terminate a particular treatment and the
physician and / or hospital personnel disagree, generally (under many
circumstances) reasonable time ought be permitted for the patient to
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change his mind or to secure another physician in order that the first
doctor may withdraw and / or to permit the patient to transfer from the
hospital to elsewhere.
In reviewing this case, one may well feel events may better have moved
more slowly and deliberately on Nov. 9, 1986, or taken an entirely different
course. To their strong credit, many of the nurses and doctors at St. Luke's
involved in this matter reflect an admirable and vigorous commitment to
the principle that every effort, and with informed consent even bold and
unique ones, are to be made to save and restore the lives of their patients.
Understandably, they were keenly desirous of proceeding with recuperative
efforts on behalf of the patient and were much distressed and greatly
concerned by the events that transpired. The forthright candor of some of
the personnel is to be much respected.
This case has obviously caused great concern to the son of the deceased
patient. It highlights the wisdom of the general counsel that physicians are
well advised to leave the care of critically ill family members to other
physicians.

E. Michael McCann
District Attorney of
Milwaukee County
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